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Introduction 
Bolivia has experienced remarkable political transforma-
tion since the turn of the 21st century. After centuries of po-
litical exclusion, indigenous peoples5 helped bring the first 
nationally successful indigenous political party to pow-
er, winning majorities in the legislature and the executive. 
The MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo, or Movement towards 
Socialism) and President Evo Morales, who took office in 
2005, represented a historic shift in the political power and 
engagement of indigenous people in Bolivia. Unlike many 
ethnically based political parties, however, the MAS has ad-
opted an inclusive approach to indigenous identity (Anria, 
2013, 2018; Madrid, 2008, 2012).
In this paper we investigate how indigenous people 
view the political system before and after this historic chan-
ge in representation. In particular, we focus on indigenous 
peoples’ support for the political system, comparing attitu-
des of indigenous and non-indigenous people before and 
after the election of Evo Morales and the MAS. The question 
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of how ethnicity informs generalized support for the poli-
tical system is important for several reasons. Much of the 
skepticism about ethnic voting is rooted in the idea that vo-
ting along ethnic lines threatens democratic accountability 
since politicians can count on co-ethnics to vote for them 
regardless of policy choices or performance. And, although 
we know from developed democracies that winners tend 
to be more supportive of the political system, have more 
trust in government and tend to think the whole electoral 
process is fairer, discussions of similar trends in developing 
democracies are much direr, including concerns that eth-
nic voting gives politicians a blank slate, limits accountabi-
lity and may undermine support for democratic systems in 
general. 
We argue that ethnic shortcuts can be very important 
in shaping political attitudes, especially in contexts of his-
toric shifts in representation for previously excluded groups 
in ethnically divided societies. Ethnicity, however, is not a 
completely different kind of signal from other political cues 
and short-cuts. Rather, co-ethnic electoral success provides 
information to voters about the fairness of the system in 
much the same way that other in-group political victories 
do. We expect that co-ethnics will show more support for 
the political system following a historic electoral victory of 
an ethnic party, much as other supporters of a winning par-
ty would. We do not expect that co-ethnic support is more 
permanent or more resilient to evidence of wrong-doing, 
unfairness, or corruption in the long term. Instead, while 
we expect indigenous people to be more favorable towards 
the system at first, over time indigenous people –like ev-
eryone else– update their evaluations based on many fac-
tors. Once the initial excitement of victory wears off, we ex-
pect co-ethnics who have direct negative interactions with 
government to view the system less favorably, contrary to 
the expectations of the literature that views ethnic voting 
as inherently less critical than other types of support, espe-
cially the more time passes from an electoral shift. 
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To explore these issues, we take advantage of a rare his-
torical occurrence where a shift in the importance of eth-
nicity in politics occurred rapidly and relatively visibly –the 
rise of an ethnically-based political party6 (the MAS) in Bo-
livia which carried the first indigenous president, Evo Mo-
rales, to electoral victory in 2005. Using AmericasBarom-
eter7 survey data from before and after this historic shift, 
we can explicitly test competing hypotheses about what 
shapes attitudes toward government and the political sys-
tem and the limits of this support. We find no difference in 
political support between indigenous and non-indigenous 
people in 2004, before the election, but in 2010, sever-
al years into the new administration, we find that indige-
nous people are significantly more supportive of the politi-
cal system than everyone else. Although ethnicity is not a 
significant predictor of support for the political system be-
fore this historic shift in ethnic representation in Bolivia, af-
ter 2005 self-identifying as indigenous is one of the stron-
gest predictors of positive support for the political system. 
This boost in support, however, is not permanent. Several 
years later, in 2017, there is no difference in system support 
between indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians and the 
boost in generalized support for the system that the election 
of an indigenous president provided fades.
We also explore the conditional factors that limit indig-
enous support for the political system over time. Follow-
6 There is some debate over whether the MAS counts as an ethnically based po-
litical party. The MAS has certainly made political and electoral claims based 
on ethnicity, and both Van Cott (2007) and Yashar (2005) identify it as an eth-
nically based political party, but Madrid points out that, unlike more tradition-
al ethnic based parties, MAS draws on populist strategies and more inclusive 
mobilization which is possible in Bolivia because of the fluid nature of eth-
nic identities (Madrid 2008, 2012). Either way, the electoral victories of the 
MAS represented a major change in the representation of indigenous people 
in government, and we are interested in how that affects attitudes of people 
who self-identify as indigenous.
7 We thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (Lapop) and its major sup-
porters (the United States Agency for International Development, the Inter-
American Development Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making the data 
available.
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ing the election, indigenous people are more supportive 
even if they did not personally vote for the MAS and even if 
they have experienced government corruption, but by 2017 
there are substantial differences in support between indig-
enous supporters of the MAS and indigenous non-support-
ers and between indigenous people who have experienced 
corruption and those who have not. 
Ethnicity, Winners and Losers, Corruption  
and System Support
In the wealthier, older democracies of the world, there is 
abundant evidence that supporters of winning politicians 
tend to have more positive attitudes toward the political 
system than supporters of losers. Supporters of winners 
tend to be more trusting of the political system (Anderson 
and LoTempio, 2002) and have generally more positive atti-
tudes toward the government and the overall political sys-
tem (Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Anderson and LoTempio, 
2002; Anderson and Mendes, 2006; Anderson and Tverdo-
va, 2003). For the most part, this difference in attitudes in 
developed democracies is seen as evidence that people’s 
personal feelings of loss or gain contaminate their overall 
evaluations of system fairness, but not as evidence that de-
mocracy as a whole is in trouble. 
In democracies of the developing world, however, these 
same dynamics are often accompanied by greater concern 
over the potential for negative attitudes about the system –
especially among those who lose an election– to spill over 
into a larger crisis of democratic legitimacy and stability. 
Gaps in attitudes between winners and losers tend to be 
larger in developing countries than in developed countries 
(Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson, 1998) and scholars tend 
to emphasize how these gaps have the potential to signal 
instability and perhaps crisis. For example, elections in de-
veloping countries are much more likely to be accompa-
nied by opposition initiated protests and boycotts (Beaulieu, 
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2014) and losers in developing countries are more likely to 
protest than their counterparts in developed countries (An-
derson and Mendes, 2006). Similarly, there is evidence that 
electoral losers have less trust in political institutions, and 
are more critical of government and politicians, but elec-
toral winners are much more uncritical in their support for 
politicians, raising concerns about accountability (Moehler, 
2009). Being a member of a winning majority or a losing 
minority also continues to affect political support even in 
the face of major institutional changes (Cho and Bratton, 
2006).
Similarly, evaluations of race and ethnicity in wealthy 
developed countries tend to focus on the benefits to minori-
ties or excluded groups of gaining representation, not the 
threat of “ethnic politics” weakening democracy. For ex-
ample, minorities tend to have more positive evaluations of 
both the government and the system when they see co-
ethnics in office (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp, 2004). This 
framework suggests that minority representatives send 
cues to co-ethnic constituents that they will be responsive 
to their collective interests (Abney and Hutcheson, 1981; 
Bobo, Lawrence and Gilliam Jr., 1990; Bratton and Cho, 
2006; Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson, 1990; Tate, 2003). As 
a result, ethnic constituents feel empowered, have great-
er rates of political participation, trust in government, po-
litical knowledge and political efficacy under conditions of 
expanding representation (Baker and Cook, 2005; Banduc-
ci, Donovan, and Karp, 2004; Barreto, Segura and Woods, 
2004; Bobo, Lawrence and Gilliam Jr., 1990; Dawson, 
1994; Gay, 2001; Mansbridge, 1999; Pantoja and Segura, 
2003; Whitby, 1997).
Discussions of ethnicity and politics in poorer develop-
ing countries, however, tend to focus on concerns over le-
gitimacy, corruption and threats to accountability. Scholarly 
attention to issues of ethnicity and democracy in develop-
ing countries is often negative and alarmist. For example, 
identity voting along ethnic lines has been seen a key bar-
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rier to successful democratic politics (Horowitz, 2001; Ra-
bushka and Shepsle, 1972) and as the main problem facing 
democratic institutions (Lijphart, 1977). Political parties or-
ganized along ethnic lines are thought to be more conflic-
tual, less stable and less democratic than political parties 
that cross-cut political divides and span across ethnic divi-
sions rather than reinforce them (Horowitz, 1985). Within 
this framework, ethnic individuals are thought to lend blind 
support to ethnic political parties to reinforce group psycho-
logical bonds of attachment even in the face of weak pre-
forming government.8
One reason why the political importance of ethnicity 
might be different in poorer, younger democracies is high 
levels of corruption. If the institutional context of democracy 
is viewed as unfair, then the potential harm one group can 
do to another is more severe, perhaps exacerbating ten-
sions between groups. As a result, there seems to be some 
interesting interactions between corruption, ethnicity and 
partisanship. Previous research has highlighted that people 
living in more corrupt countries have lower levels of trust 
in civil servants than people living in less corrupt coun-
tries (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003) and corruption also 
leads to lower levels of diffuse support for the political sys-
tem (Seligson, 2002). People, however, may be more for-
giving of corruption within their own party. For example, 
experimental evidence from Spain shows partisan bias in 
attitudes toward corruption (Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz, 
8 More recently, scholarship has focused on the complicated ways that ethnic 
identities inform politics. Ferree (2010), in her book on South Africa, argues 
that what looks like a clear ethnic census in elections “is in fact politically en-
gineered, the end result of a negative framing strategy employed by the ruling 
party to neutralize its competition”. Likewise, recent work on ethnic political 
parties takes issue with the characterization that parties that invoke ethnic 
identities are incompatible with democracy (Chandra, 2005). In Latin America, 
Madrid has argued that ethnic political parties may actually benefit democra-
cy through increased political participation and engagement (Madrid, 2005b). 
Although the rise of ethnic parties has changed politics in Latin America, it is 
by no means clear that the change is for the worse (Madrid, 2005b, 2005a, 
2005c).
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2013). People who voted for the winner in corrupt coun-
tries are more trusting than people who voted for the loser, 
and winners’ trust is less affected by corruption than losers’ 
trust (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003). This paper builds on 
this existing literature and explores how attitudes toward 
the political system are shaped by ethnic identity, winning 
and losing, and personal experiences with corruption in the 
unusual context of the first election in which an ethnic po-
litical party competes for office and wins. 
Bolivia, because of the election of an indigenous presi-
dent after a long history of excluding indigenous people, is 
an interesting place to explore these issues in a democracy 
in the developing world. Two recent papers use survey data 
from Bolivia to explore how ethnicity might affect more gen-
eralized attitudes about the political system. The first, writ-
ten by Huebertand Liu (2017), focuses on trust in the supreme 
court. They find that before the election of Evo Morales, in-
digenous people are less trusting of the court than white or 
mestizo respondents. In 2010, several years into the admin-
istration, in contrast, there is no difference between groups. 
They take the 2010 lack of difference between indigenous 
people and white or mestizo people as evidence that hav-
ing an indigenous government in power has equalized atti-
tudes about the judiciary. Second, Madrid and Rhodes-Pur-
dy (2016) finds that indigenous people are more supportive 
of the political system in Bolivia following the election of 
Evo Morales, but find little support for a similar bump among 
women in countries with female presidents or even for in-
digenous people in other Latin American countries with in-
digenous leaders, something they attribute to the clear claim 
that Morales made as an indigenous president. 
Both of these papers show that co-ethnicity is associated 
with more support for political institutions in some circum-
stances, but offer little in terms of understanding the limits 
of ethnicity compared with other factors that shape system 
support. We expand on their analysis to compare ethnici-
ty with partisanship and also to test the limits of co-ethnic 
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support in the face of difficult personal experiences with 
corruption. In the next section, we lay out our argument 
that ethnicity is one of many useful –but not determinative– 
factors that people use as shortcuts for evaluating political 
systems, as well as the specific hypotheses we will test. 
Ethnicity, Partisanship and System Support:  
Theory and Hypotheses 
We argue that both ethnicity and the success of a favored 
political party can be useful ways in which people evalu-
ate how well a political system is working for them. That is, 
people who see co-ethnics win elections are likely to expe-
rience a similar boost in support for the political systems to 
people who see their favored party win an election, regard-
less of ethnicity. Neither of these factors, however, is stronger 
than direct experiences with the political system –we ex-
pect personal experience with corruption to counteract, or 
at least dampen, both of these more positive heuristics. Cor-
ruption can dampen political system support because co-
ethnics and co-partisans begin to see that the political sys-
tem is not working fairly, effectively or efficiently. 
Ethnicity can be an important and useful tool for mobi-
lizing political support and an important factor in shaping 
attitudes toward government and support for the political 
system. This is especially true in countries where ethnic-
ity is politically important, where political parties campaign 
along ethnic lines, and where longstanding political divi-
sions have an ethnic dimension. But we know that indi-
viduals who vote for winning political parties (political 
winners) also have increased positive evaluations of the 
political system. In other words, ethnicity can be a particu-
larly powerful heuristic in some circumstances and seeing 
co-ethnics assume political office can encourage more posi-
tive attitudes toward the political system, much the same 
way that seeing your political party win an election often 
leads to more positive attitudes toward the political system. 
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H1: Following the election of Evo Morales, 
we expect indigenous peoples in Bolivia to hold 
more positive views of the political system than 
non-indigenous Bolivians. 
We also expect that the excitement of a historic election of 
a member of a marginalized group will have a declining ef-
fect on generalized political support. Shortly after the elec-
tion, we expect that indigenous people will be more sup-
portive than non-indigenous people, but we do not expect 
that effect to last indefinitely. The waning support could be 
due to a changing perspective among indigenous people, 
whose demands may have begun to grow beyond simply 
having a co-ethnic president. Similarly, the effect of de-
scriptive representation may fade with time, particularly as 
criticism of the Morales administration begins to attenuate 
support. 
H2: We expect indigenous peoples to hold 
very positive attitudes toward the political sys-
tem after the first election of Evo Morales, but 
that the difference between indigenous and non-
indigenous attitudes will narrow with time. 
Finally, we will also test conditional hypotheses to explore 
the relative importance of these factors in shaping attitudes 
toward the political system. Indigenous people may be more 
supportive in the short term, even if they did not directly 
vote for the MAS or even if they have experienced corrup-
tion, but we do not expect that generalized favorability to 
last indefinitely. We expect that indigenous people will be-
come more critical of the political system as the time from 
the initial electoral victory increases. 
We disagree, however, that ethnicity leads to more blind 
support for co-ethnic political leaders. Although co-ethnics 
may view the political system more favorably when their 
ethnic group is in power, personal experience with corrup-
tion can erode these differences, especially as time from a 
historic election passes. The source of co-ethnic support is 
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not blind psychological attachment, but rather a signal that 
the system is more open and fairer than previously thought. 
One implication of this argument is that co-ethnic citizens 
are not automatically less critical of the system in the face 
of evidence of unfairness or corruption. People of any eth-
nicity who experience their government failing them in 
personal and important ways are likely to be less support-
ive of the political system. 
We argue that most citizens want democratic govern-
ment to work efficient and fairly. When disruptions of this 
norm occur in very personal ways, like personally experi-
encing a corrupt act, these experiences are likely to erode 
confidence in the political system and process (Chang and 
Chu, 2006; Della Porta, 2000; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, 
1998; Seligson, 2002). Thus, when citizens have personal 
encounters with corruption, regardless of ethnicity or po-
litical party and even under conditions of extreme divisions, 
they are less likely to see the political process as fair and 
just. Immediately after a historic election, we expect indig-
enous people to be more forgiving, but, as time passes, we 
expect indigenous people to evaluate the political system 
based on these personal experiences much as any other 
citizen would. 
H3: The effect of corruption will have a 
stronger negative effect on attitudes of indige-
nous peoples the longer the time from the initial 
election of Evo Morales. 
We do not expect ethnicity to erase the importance of par-
tisan attachments or the effect of voting for the winning 
political party. Rather, we see ethnicity as one potentially 
useful heuristic that can function much like partisan cues 
or attachment. Political winners often feel that their vote 
made a difference in ushering their favored candidate to 
political office, which typically translates into more positive 
political evaluations. We expect these boosts in positive at-
titudes to persist in deeply divided societies and hold even 
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for non-ethnic winners. In this sense, winning and ethnic 
attachments are separate mechanisms, both of which can 
be important for political attitudes and evaluations. For ex-
ample, a co-ethnic may experience a boost in positive feel-
ings toward the political system upon seeing someone of 
their own ethnicity in power, even if they voted for some-
one else –especially if it was a new or unusual occurrence. 
Likewise, we expect people who voted for the winning par-
ty will have more positive attitudes regardless of ethnicity.
Once the initial excitement of the first indigenous presi-
dent fades, we expect indigenous people to become more 
divided in their evaluations of government. Although most 
indigenous people experienced a positive boost in the at-
titudes toward government as Evo Morales came to power, 
over time people have different personal experiences and 
some are likely to become more critical. 
H4: We expect that as time from the first elec-
tion passes, indigenous peoples will become 
more divided in their evaluations of the political 
system. 
Why Bolivia?
The question of how support for the political system has de-
veloped and evolved in Bolivia for indigenous peoples is 
particularly important given that they have suffered a long 
history of exclusion, discrimination, and economic hardship. 
Although the combined populations of the Quechua, Ayma-
ra, Guaraní and Amazonian peoples make up a majority of 
the population of Bolivia, they experience much harder lives 
than their non-indigenous counterparts. In the 1990s, indig-
enous communities were poorer, had poorer housing, less 
access to sanitation services, and less education (Liberato, 
Pomeroy and Fennell, 2006). Indigenous people were al-
so likely to die younger and more likely to suffer the loss of 
their children at a young age (Robles, 1996). Politically, in-
digenous people were also excluded and marginalized from 
52 REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE OPINIÓN PÚBLICA / NÚMERO 8 (1), 2019
the political process (Albro, 2006; Van Cott, 2000, 2007; 
Yashar, 1999, 2005).
Signs of change began to emerge in the early 2000s. 
First, following major decentralization reforms in the late 
1990s, indigenous candidates gained ground in local elec-
tions, winning representation on city and municipal coun-
cils and governments. At the same time, a new political 
party entered the scene, claiming to represent the inter-
ests of the poor and indigenous majority of Bolivians. This 
new party of the MAS made impressive gains by offering 
an alternative to a political party system that was wide-
ly viewed as in crisis. While the MAS originated in the 
highlands, merging the indigenous movement and the co-
ca grower’s unions, it expanded across the country, forg-
ing alliances with peasant organizations and indigenous 
movement leaders in the low-lands and garnering sup-
port in urban spaces like El Alto among the Aymara major-
ity population (Anria, 2018). In 2005, the MAS candidate, 
Evo Morales, won the presidency, becoming the first Bo-
livian president to win a majority of votes, and the first in-
digenous president. The same year, the MAS won a major-
ity in the national legislature and made huge gains in local 
elections.
The election of Evo Morales brought no less than a 
monumental shift in Bolivian politics. In a country where 
the colonial imprint had structurally favored the coloniz-
ing Spaniards and disadvantaged the Natives, prior to the 
election of Morales, Bolivia had been historically governed 
by a dominant white minority to the detriment of an indig-
enous majority. While indigenous people gained the right 
to vote in the 1952 revolution, and other measures were 
passed to further increase democratic participation of in-
digenous people, such as the Law of Popular Participation 
of 1994 (Mayorga, 2006; Zuazo Oblitas, Faguet and Boni-
faz Moreno, 2012), none of these changes were success-
ful in substantially incorporating the indigenous voice in-
to Bolivian politics, and indigenous communities continued 
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to suffer marginalization and discrimination. These incre-
mental changes, where indigenous people were acknowl-
edged by the law but not fully recognized into the political 
machinery, produced an ethnic affirmation that questioned 
the foundations of the social pact and fed an expectation of 
change that culminated –but did not end– with the victory 
of Evo Morales (Loayza Bueno, 2014). 
More bluntly, Morales’ victory occurred in a context 
where just decades earlier Bolivians of Morales’ class and 
skin color weren’t allowed to vote. MAS and Evo Morales’ 
political party won an unprecedented 53.74% during the 
2005 election with an indigenous majority as his base. Ac-
cording to a 2006 Lapop survey, Evo Morales and the MAS 
won 71% of the vote of self-identified indigenous people, 
51% of the vote of self-identified mestizos, and 32% of 
self-identified whites (Madrid 2014). Since then, the MAS 
has dominated Bolivian politics winning every single ma-
jor election. While there is some discussion over whether 
the MAS can be included as an ethnically based political 
party, the party’s platform sought to woo indigenous voters 
through ethnic appeals, drawing on indigenous symbols 
and histories, and developing strong links to indigenous 
leaders and organizations, and embracing the demands of 
indigenous movements –land reform and multicultural ed-
ucation among them. Moreover, as part of its populist rhet-
oric, the MAS criticized the traditional parties and elites 
and introduced themselves as the outcast who would serve 
the interest of the poor and indigenous (Madrid, 2014). 
After taking office, Morales used constitutional reform to 
push for a radical re-interpretation of Bolivian national iden-
tity. The 2009 constitutional reform set out rights for the in-
digenous majority, granting more regional and local auton-
omy to them, and redefined “Bolivia as a multi-ethnic and 
pluri-cultural nation”(BBC, 2016). The number of indigenous 
people in public office dramatically increased. Moreover, the 
Linguistic Law of Bolivia (Law Nº 269) recognized 36 indig-
enous languages as the official languages of Bolivia (with 
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Spanish) and required public workers to speak at least 
one of these indigenous languages. Other social and public 
works programs have reduced poverty and extreme poverty 
by 25% and 43% respectively. This is important in Bolivia 
given that income and ethnicity are strongly correlated, as 
those at the bottom of the economic ladder have historically 
been indigenous. However, while there have been impor-
tant changes in the political, social and economic structures 
of Bolivia since Morales took power, the length of his ten-
ure is a matter of great debate in Bolivia. While he remains 
somewhat popular, levels of support are not the same as 
those in his early years. Schilling-Vacaflor (2011) noted that 
while the new Bolivian basic law of 2009 contributed to 
considerable changes in the social, political, economic and 
symbolic order, there are still major factors that limit a fully 
participatory and pluralist democracy.
In 2016, a major defeat to the Morales administration 
came with a referendum that asked the electorate if he 
should be allowed to stand for a fourth term in office. The 
constitutional amendment was defeated by 51% to 49%. 
While a narrow lost, it signals discontent among a grow-
ing segment of the population. In part, Morales’s popularity 
has been eroded in the last few years by corruption scan-
dals at higher and lower levels of government as well as 
accusations of authoritarianism. Another challenge to the 
continuation of the Morales administration and the sup-
port he receives from the population, and one somewhat 
understudied, is the changes that the indigenous popula-
tions have themselves undergone since 2005. Indigenous 
people have transformed in how they situate themselves 
in the social and political arena. The political and econom-
ic transformation that opened institutional channels for the 
participation of the indigenous population has also brought 
with it the incentives necessary for these communities to 
want to be better informed of their rights and use them. 
In this extraordinary context, we are interested in the po-
litical attitudes of indigenous people, especially related to 
REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE OPINIÓN PÚBLICA / NÚMERO 8 (1), 2019 55
their overall support for the political system that once ex-
cluded them. 
Research Design
We explore these hypotheses using three waves of sur-
vey data from the AmericasBarometer by the Latin Amer-
ican Public Opinion Project (Lapop) for Bolivia: 2004, the 
year before Evo Morales was elected; 2010, the year after 
his sweeping re-election to a second term; and 2016-2017, 
more than a decade into the indigenous administration and 
shortly after a constitutional referendum vote that would 
have allowed Morales to run for a third presidential term.9
Dependent Variable
We are interested in generalized support for the political 
system as a way of getting at attitudes about how well the 
political system is working. The index we use is based on 
five questions about trust and confidence in Bolivian insti-
tutions, including a question about guarantees for a fair tri-
al, respect for political institutions, pride in the Bolivian po-
litical system, support for the system, and trust in the police. 
We recognize that these questions are far from perfect, and 
there are many possible ways to measure the attitudes we 
are interested in. We choose this index because the ques-
tions tend to track together and because we think the con-
tent of the questions gets close to the idea we are focused 
9 We use these years for clarity of presentation, but the models are consistent 
across all the years available for the survey. Included in the appendix is an 
analysis of the full panel: 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016/17. 
Note that, like in 2004, the results for 2006 indicate that there is no signi-
ficant difference in how indigenous people and non-indigenous groups feel 
about the political system. Given that Morales was elected just months prior 
to the surveys (conducted in March and April), some might find this puzzling. 
However, given the context of high political instability in the country the years 
prior, it is not that surprising that indigenous voters were still somewhat di-
sillusioned and skeptical of the political system overall. Additionally, the fact 
that the sign of the coefficient changes to positive from 2008 on suggests that 
indigenous people are only more supportive after seeing a government that 
did more for them, not simply in the aftermath of the election.
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on: peoples’ overall orientation and sense of support for the 
political system they live in. This question is particularly 
important during times of massive political upheaval when 
institutions are facing new changes and challenges (Boul-
ding and Nelson-Núñez, 2014). 
Our dependent variable is support for the political sys-
tem. To measure political system support we use the Selig-
son political support-alienation scale. As Muller, Jukam and 
Seligson (1982) note, this measure provides a more objec-
tive measure of diffuse political system support than oth-
er measures of trust in government. This mean index com-
bines five items asking respondents to rank the following 
on a scale from 1-7: 
• To what extent do you think the courts in Bolivia gua-
rantee a fair trial?
• To what extent do you respect the political institutions 
of Bolivia?
• To what extent do you feel proud of living in the Boli-
vian political system?
• To what extent do you think that one should support 
the Bolivian political system?
• To what extent do you trust the police?
Combining these variables yields a new variable (political 
system support) that ranges from 1-7, with higher values 
indicating more favorable levels of political system sup-
port.10
Independent and Control Variables 
Ethnic Identity (Indigenous): We create a dichotomous vari-
able from an indicator that asks respondents to self-identi-
fy their racial category. All respondents were coded as a 1 
10 These five indicators are highly correlated and produce a scale reliability cor-
relation of .75 in 2004, .72 in 2010 and .75 in 2017. Combining these vari-
ables yields a new variable (political system support) that ranges from 1-7, 
with higher values indicating more favorable levels of political system support.
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if they self-identified as being indigenous or “original” and 
0 if the respondent identified as a member of another racial 
group (white, mestizo, black, mulatto or other).
Political Winners and Losers: Since we are looking to 
test the extent to which co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic win-
ners and losers feel differently about the political sys-
tem, controlling for ethnicity, we use a retrospective vote 
choice, whereby all individuals were asked to recall who 
they voted for in the last election. We coded all individu-
als that identified Morales as a political winner (1) and all 
non-MAS retrospective vote choices are classified as politi-
cal losers (0). 
Corruption: Our measure of corruption captures the ex-
tent to which citizens have directly been asked to pay 
bribes by either the police or a government official. Previ-
ous research has noted that corruption can have both nega-
tive effects on national economies (Elliott, 1997; Rose-Ack-
erman, 1999; Mauro, 1995; Weyland, 1998) and reduce 
levels of trust and perceptions of legitimacy in the political 
system and institutions (Seligson, 2002; Canache and Alli-
son, 2005). Our measure of corruption is based on two dif-
ferent questions from the survey. The first asks: Has a police 
officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months? The 
second focuses on government officials: In the last twelve 
months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe? 
Responses to these yes/no questions were recoded so that 
positive responses to either question indicates experience 
with corruption. 
We also include control variables for several other po-
litical factors that might shape support for the political sys-
tem including ideology political orientation,11 interpersonal 
11 Ideology is captured by the following indicator: Nowadays, when we speak of 
political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other 
words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. 
According to the meaning that the terms “left” and “right” have for you, and 
thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on 
a 10-point scale? Higher values indicate more left leaning ideological self-
placement.
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trust,12 civil society participation,13 rural locality,14 poverty 
(asset index),15 respondents level of education, where high-
er values indicate higher levels of respondent education, 
and also if the respondent had lost their job in the last year.
We test our hypotheses in a series of multilevel models. 
Multilevel models are increasingly popular for survey da-
ta, acknowledging that context has important implications 
for individual political evaluations and outcomes (Fitzgerald 
and Wolak, 2014; Snijders , 2011; Steenbergen and Jones, 
2002; Wolak, 2014). Multilevel models allow us to handle 
both individual and contextual level data and account for 
variance in our dependent variable at both the individual 
and municipal levels. We use municipal level data because 
municipalities are important levels of governance in Boliv-
ia and important levels for organizing in both rural and ur-
ban localities. Table 1 represents a baseline estimate of the 
amount of variance of system support at the individual and 
municipal levels. 
12 We include a measure of interpersonal trust constructed from an indicator that 
asks respondents the following: Speaking of the people from around here, 
would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat 
trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy? More trusting values are 
coded high with lower trusting values coded low. 
13 Participation in civil society can have significant effects on individual political 
behavior and how individuals view the political system (Boulding and Nelson-
Núñez, 2014).Thus, we control for civil society participation using a dichotomous 
measure composed of the following set of questions: Do you attend: Meetings 
of any religious organization? Meetings of a parents’ association at school? 
Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Meetings of 
an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers? Meet-
ings of a political party or political organization? If respondents indicated that 
they never attended a meeting they were coded as a 0 and if respondents 
noted that they attended any of the meetings above in the last year, they 
were coded as a 1. Alternatively, we ran models with a mean and additive in-
dex of civil society participation and the results still hold. 
14 The AmericasBarometer considers an area rural if the population is less than 
20,000 individuals. This variable is coded “1” for rural municipalities and “0” 
for urban. 
15 To capture poverty, we use a poverty measure that is derived from principle 
components factor analysis of various assets individuals own including a col-
or television, refrigerator, telephone, washing machine, microwave, electricity, 
drinking water, sewerage connection, and bicycle (Cordova 2008).
REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE OPINIÓN PÚBLICA / NÚMERO 8 (1), 2019 59
The constant in Table 1indicates the mean level of sys-
tem support within each individual sample year (model 1 
for 2004, model 2 for 2010, model 3 for 2017) and in a mod-
el where we pool all survey years (model 4). For example, 
the mean level of system support in 2004 was 3.7 and was 
about .4 points greater in 2010 (4.1) and dropped to 3.9 in 
2017. Pooling all years, the data notes that the mean level of 
system support was 3.7 over the three sample years. 
The variance components indicate that there is a signifi-
cant amount of variance at both the individual and munici-
pal level. More than 87% of the variance is located at the 
individual level in 2004, 84% in 2010, 96% in 2017 and 
around 88% in the pooled sample, with the remaining vari-
ance situated at the municipal level. These findings suggest 
that a multilevel model is a useful approach as it permits 
explanation of cross municipal differences while control-
ling for individual differences that account for the majority 
of variance in system support. 
Table 1. 
System Support Analysis of Variance
 2004 2010 2017 Pooled
Fixed Effects
Municipal level 
(t00)
3.715*** 4.151*** 3.936*** 3.715***
(0.050) (0.047) (0.049) (0.050)
Variance Components
Individual level 
(s2)
0.395*** 0.430*** 0.245*** 0.395***
(0.040) (0.043) (0.048) (0.040)
Municipal level 
(t00)
1.050*** 0.987*** 1.278*** 1.050***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.014)
Percent of the variance 
at the municipal level 12.36% 15.94% 3.53% 12.36%
-2 x Log Likelihood -4213.82 -3860.92 -2548.87 -4213.82
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Multilevel logistic regression. Standard 
errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project.
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Results 
Our ethnicity hypothesis predicts that after a major elector-
al shift in favor of an ethnic party, co-ethnics should have 
greater levels of system support when compared to people 
of other ethnicities. In our case, we expect that indigenous 
Bolivians will report higher generalized support for the po-
litical system after the historic election of Evo Morales and 
the MAS. In Table 2 we test this hypothesis by modeling 
the effects of ethnicity on political system support in 2004 
(before the election) and 2010 (several years into the ad-
ministration) individually and in a pooled model. The re-
sults indicate that in 2004 there is no significant difference 
in how indigenous people and non-indigenous groups feel 
about the political system. In 2010, however, ethnicity be-
comes an important factor in shaping support for the po-
litical system. In this 2010 model, indigenous people have 
greater levels of system support when compared to non-in-
digenous people. To test this difference more rigorously, we 
pool the data into a single model and include an interaction 
term (indigenous* 2010) to test the extent to which there is 
a statistically significant difference in system support be-
tween the two years. The results support our first hypothe-
sis: In 2010, indigenous peoples are more supportive of the 
political system than non-indigenous people and the slope 
of the indigenous variable is significantly different in 2010 
when compared to 2004.
We expect that ethnicity can be a useful indication for 
how well the political system works (and seeing your own 
previously excluded group come to power is an exciting 
signal the system may be working better than you thought), 
but over time other considerations come back in. As the ad-
ministration stays in power over years, indigenous people –
like everyone else– update their attitudes based on a mix of 
experiences and beliefs. When we look at the 2017 model, 
indigenous people no longer have significantly different at-
titudes about the political system than other Bolivians. 
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Table 2: Ethnicity and System Support
2004 Model 2010 Model 2017 Model Pooled  Model
Indigenous -0.0228 0.312*** 0.0460 -0.0398
(0.0635) (0.0709) (0.107) (0.0647)
Year Dummy (2010) 0.389***
(0.0360)
Year Dummy (2017) 0.288***
(0.0636)
Indigenous *2010 0.374***
(0.0965)
Indigenous *2017 0.220
(0.115)
Left-Right 0.0735*** -0.0704*** -0.000925 0.0129
(0.0105) (0.0113) (0.0141) (0.00686)
Interpersonal trust 0.114*** 0.157*** 0.145*** 0.117***
(0.0245) (0.0270) (0.0392) (0.0168)
Organizational Participation 0.125* 0.0659 0.404** 0.169***
(0.0539) (0.0666) (0.125) (0.0409)
Rural 0.287*** -0.145 0.133 0.0882
(0.0852) (0.0800) (0.0833) (0.0470)
Wealth (Asset Index) -0.000903 0.0137 -0.0892*** -0.00666
(0.0170) (0.0178) (0.0268) (0.0114)
Age -0.00595*** -0.00170 -0.0143*** -0.00687***
(0.00155) (0.00157) (0.00229) (0.00103)
Gender (man) -0.133** -0.0481 -0.108 -0.0970***
(0.0430) (0.0423) (0.0685) (0.0289)
Education -0.00338 -0.00786 -0.0631*** -0.0221***
(0.00576) (0.00605) (0.00913) (0.00391)
Constant 3.210*** 4.261*** 5.070*** 3.824***
(0.141) (0.147) (0.196) (0.0945)
Municipal level (t00) 0.1343 0.1470 0.0202 0.0694
(0.295) (0.034) (0.016) (0.0136)
Number of Municipalities 82 118 64 187
Number of Observations 2357 2140 1297 5794
-2 x log likelihood -3448.79 -2993.09 -2087.647 -8718.21
Note: Multilevel logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001
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In Figure 1, we plot the predicted margins based on 
the pooled model for all three years. As this figure notes, 
in 2004 there is no significant difference in system support 
between indigenous and non-indigenous people, though 
non-indigenous people have slightly higher support than 
indigenous people. But in 2010, we see that indigenous 
people have more system support (roughly a .3 difference) 
than non-indigenous people. In 2017, although indigenous 
people continue to have slightly higher levels of support, 
the difference is not statistically significant. In all, we find 
support for our first hypothesis that co-ethnics in general 
have more positive attitudes toward government than non 
co-ethnics following the electoral shift. Indigenous people, 
after witnessing a historic election of an indigenous party, 
hold significantly more positive attitudes about the whole 
political system than non-indigenous people. Comparison 
of the data over more than a decade into the administra-
tion, however, clearly shows that the boost in generalized 
support for the political system declines over time. 
Figure 1. 
Indigenous System Support Before and After Election of MAS
Predictive Margins of Self-Identifying as Indigenous on System Support
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Indigenous Identity and Support for MAS 
Next, we consider the role of having voted for the MAS. Is 
our variable for indigenous identity simply measuring the 
effect of electoral winners feeling more supportive of the 
system? The simple answer is no. In this dataset, there are 
respondents in all categories: co-ethnic supporters, non-
supporters, electoral winners and electoral losers, as noted 
in Tables 3A and 3B. 
Table 3A. 
Ethnicity, Winners and Losers, 2010
Indigenous Non-Indigenous Total
MAS supporters 327(90%) 940(59%) 1267
Non-MAS 37(10%) 643(41%) 680
Total 364 1583
Pearson chi2(1) = 120.7698  Pr = 0.000
Note: Percentages represent indigenous/non-indigenous 
people who are/are not MAS supporters.
Table 3B. 
 Ethnicity, Winners and Losers, 2017
Indigenous Non-Indigenous Total
MAS supporters 125(86%) 545(65%) 670
Non-MAS 20(14%) 296(35%) 316
Total 145 841
Pearson chi2(1) = 26.0155  Pr = 0.000
Note: Percentages represent indigenous/non-indigenous 
people who are/are not MAS supporters.
On one hand, people who feel like winners in the politi-
cal process may feel their vote counted in getting their fa-
vored candidate into office, and may also feel more positive-
ly about the political system in general. On the other hand, 
losers in the political process may feel more negative about 
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the political system and political process since their fa-
vored candidate did not win political office. Do co-ethnics 
and winners and losers view the political system different-
ly? We model this in 2010,16 after the electoral victory of the 
ethnic political party. We find that both the ethnic identity 
and the political winner variables are significant, but the 
effect of having supported the winner is slightly larger than 
the effect of co-ethnicity. 
Figure 2A. 
Indigenous, Non-Indigenous, Winners and Losers 2010
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Obviously, many indigenous people also voted in support of 
the MAS, so it is important to try to separate out the effects 
16 Ideally, we would also like to be able to compare the effect of ethnicity with 
voting for the winner in 2004 but the political circumstances of 2003 and 
2004 in Bolivia make this a very tricky question. In October of 2003, the elect-
ed president Sanchez de Lozada was forced to resign amid mass protests. The 
vice president, Carlos Mesa, took over the presidency but tried (unsuccessfully) 
to resign several times as protests continued. A referendum was held in 2004, 
but special presidential elections were not held until 2005, when Evo Morales 
and the MAS first came to power. Because of these unusual circumstances, it is 
not clear how we would determine whether a respondent voted for the win-
ner in 2004. 
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of ethnicity and partisanship. In Figures 3 and 4, we show 
the margins for the effect of ethnicity, conditioned on win-
ning and losing (see full model in Table 4 in the appendix).
The figure shows winners as more supportive of the politi-
cal system regardless of ethnicity in both 2010 and 2017. In-
digenous people are more supportive than non-indigenous 
people, but the effect of ethnicity is weaker than the effect 
of having supported the winner. To a large degree our fin-
dings are consistent with the existent literature suggesting 
that winning has a positive effect on the way individuals 
view the political system. But testing the effects of ethnicity, 
winning and losing jointly reveals that both co-ethnic and 
non co-ethnic winners trend in the same positive direction 
in their immediate evaluations of the political system: both 
are more supportive of the political system than people who 
are not indigenous and did not support the MAS.
Figure 2B.  
Indigenous, Non-Indigenous, Winners and Losers 2017
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When we look at political losers, we see some unique mod-
erating effects for system support. The predicted probabili-
66 REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE OPINIÓN PÚBLICA / NÚMERO 8 (1), 2019
ties note that co-ethnic losers (indigenous people who did 
not report an inclination to vote for the MAS) have high-
er levels of system support than non-indigenous losers (4.3 
and 3.8 respectively) in 2010, but 2010 with 2016/17 shows 
a clear difference. In 2010, indigenous support was high re-
gardless of having voted for the MAS or not. For non-in-
digenous people, support was much more tied to having 
supported the MAS, with supporters feeling more favorably 
toward the political system. In 2017, however, indigenous 
attitudes also separate by support for the MAS.
We see a similar change over time when we consider 
the effect of personal experience with corruption on atti-
tudes about the political system. In 2010, indigenous sup-
port is still higher, even for those who have been asked to 
pay a bribe (Figure 3A). In 2017, however, the difference is 
much smaller between indigenous bribe victims and non-
indigenous bribe victims (Figure 3B).
Figure 3A. 
 Ethnicity and Bribe Victimization 2010
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Figure 3B. 
Ethnicity and Bribe Victimization 2017
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Conclusions
Dealing with historical divisions and histories of political 
exclusion raises interesting questions for any democracy. 
But in new democracies, when these aggrieved individuals 
and groups rise to political office, some worry about insta-
bility and a decline of legitimacy. We find that these con-
cerns may be too simplistic as they tend to suggest that in-
dividuals blindly follow ethnic cues ignoring other factors 
that we know shape political attitudes and behavior. In this 
paper, we unpack the effects of ethnicity and partisan sup-
port for an ethnic political party in Bolivia. The rise of the 
MAS presented a unique historical opportunity to test the 
independent and conditional effects of ethnic and co-par-
tisanship support and we see that both of these identities 
condition system support in important ways. Both co-eth-
nics and political winners tend to have higher levels of po-
litical system support after significant electoral victories. 
Non co-ethnics and those that did not vote for the winning 
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ethnic party have noticeably lower support for the political 
system.
Importantly, however, we also find little evidence that 
the support of political winners and co-ethnics is uncondi-
tional over the long term. As the results from the 2016 ref-
erendum demonstrate, indigenous people are not uniformly 
supportive of the Morales administration. Roughly 21% of 
indigenous peoples voted no on the referendum that would 
have allowed Morales to run for an additional term. Perhaps 
more telling, 10% of indigenous voters left their ballots 
blank, possibly a sign of unwillingness to vote yes, but al-
so reluctance to vote against the indigenous party. Overall, 
we see stronger support for Morales from indigenous peo-
ple than from non-indigenous, but not a uniform response. 
Table 4. 
Indigenous Support in the 2016 Referendum
Indigenous Non-Indigenous Total
Voted YES 103 (53%) 463 (37%) 566
Voted NO 41 (21%) 443(36%) 484
Did not vote 32 (16%) 177 (14%) 209
Blank ballot 20 (10%) 158 (13%) 178
Total 196 1241
Note: Percentages represent indigenous/non-indigenous 
people who voted yes, no or blank or did not vote.
Although indigenous people are more supportive of the po-
litical system in the short term regardless of who they voted 
for or personal experience with corruption, over time they 
have become more critical. Rather, we find compelling evi-
dence that personal experiences with corruption dampen 
the enthusiasm for both ethnic voters and political winners. 
So, despite evidence that people feel better about the polit-
ical system when they are getting something positive from 
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it –either in terms of partisan support of ethnicity, neither of 
these factors serves as a real buffer against the frustrations 
that come with being asked to pay a bribe or being con-
fronted with overt corruption in the longer term. This find-
ing is important for two reasons. First, it is a cautionary tale 
about the damaging effects of corruption on support for the 
political system, even among those who otherwise might 
be the most enthusiastic supporters. Second, it also sug-
gests that fears of an ethnic “blank check” of political sup-
port for co-ethnics are overstated. Further research could 
investigate the effects of co-ethnicity on tolerance of au-
thoritarianism and other illiberal attitudes. In regard to sup-
port for the political system, however, we find no evidence 
that the boost in support that co-ethnics experience is any 
more resistant to updating on the basis of personal expe-
riences than other foundations of support, especially the 
more time passes from an initial election.
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Appendix 
Appendix Table 1. 
Summary Statistics 
Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
2004 Survey Year
System Support Mean 
Index 2828 3.65 1.12 1 7
Indigenous or Original 3073 0.16 0.36 0 1
Bribe Victimization 3061 0.24 0.43 0 1
Left/Right Scale 2530 5.19 2.09 1 10
Interpersonal Trust 3021 2.45 0.90 1 4
Organizational  
Participation 3070 0.18 0.39 0 1
Rural 3073 0.35 0.48 0 1
Asset/Quintall Index 3060 2.41 1.41 1 5
Age 3072 36.74 14.64 18 84
Male 3073 0.50 0.50 0 1
Education 3073 10.43 4.51 0 18
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2010 Survey Year
System Support Mean 
Index 2688 4.10 1.04 1 7
Indigenous or Original 3018 0.15 0.36 0 1
Bribe Victimization 3005 0.23 0.42 0 1
Winner (MAS  
Supporter) 1970 0.64 0.48 0 1
Left/Right Scale 2399 5.31 2.00 1 10
Interpersonal Trust 2946 2.62 0.85 1 4
Organizational  
Participation 2986 0.13 0.33 0 1
Rural 3018 0.37 0.48 0 1
Asset/Quintall Index 2983 2.72 1.41 1 5
Age 3016 37.15 15.09 18 86
Male 3018 0.50 0.50 0 1
Education 3011 10.23 4.60 0 18
2017 Survey Year
System Support Mean 
Index 1521 3.88 1.30 1 7
Indigenous or Original 1680 0.13 0.33 0 1
Bribe Victimization 1670 0.32 0.47 0 1
Winner  
(MAS Supporter) 986 0.68 0.46 0 1
Left/Right Scale 1487 5.20 2.43 1 10
Interpersonal Trust 1610 2.43 0.88 1 4
Organizational  
Participation 1679 0.09 0.29 0 1
Rural 1680 0.32 0.47 0 1
Asset/Quintall Index 1585 2.94 1.43 1 5
Age 1680 39.1 15.7 18 88
Male 1680 0.50 0.50 0 1
Education 1674 10.92 4.67 0 18
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Appendix Table 2. 
 System Support Analysis of Variance: All Years
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2017 Pooled
Fixed Effects
Municipal 
Level
(t00)
3.715*** 
(0.050)
4.053*** 
(0.050)
4.055*** 
(0.044)
4.151*** 
(0.047)
3.892*** 
(0.057)
3.978*** 
(0.048)
3.936*** 
(0.049)
3.715*** 
(0.050)
Variance  
Components
Individual  
Level
(s2)
0.395*** 
(0.040)
0.385*** 
(0.041)
0.388*** 
(0.036)
0.430*** 
(0.043)
0.472*** 
(0.046)
0.370*** 
(0.039)
0.245*** 
(0.048)
0.395*** 
(0.040)
Municipal 
Level
(t00)
1.050*** 
(0.014)
1.059*** 
(0.015)
0.972*** 
(0.014)
0.987*** 
(0.014)
1.023*** 
(0.014)
0.995*** 
(0.013)
1.278*** 
(0.024)
1.050*** 
(0.014)
% of the  
variance  
at the  
municipal 
level
12.36% 11.68% 13.75% 15.94% 17.53% 12.16% 3.53% 12.36%
-2 x Log 
Likelihood -4213.82 -3844.58 -3686.30 -3860.92 -3807.88 -4093.28 -2548.87 -4213.82
Obs. 2827.000 2565.000 2598.000 2688.000 2589.000 2852.000 1521.000 2827.000
Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Appendix Table 3. 
 Ethnicity and System Support for All Years
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2017 
Pooled
 Model
Indigenous -0.0228 -0.0941 0.119 0.312*** 0.109 0.0568 0.0460 -0.0160
(0.0635) (0.0681) (0.0663) (0.0709) (0.0730) (0.0678) (0.107) (0.0617)
Left-Right 0.0735*** 0.0651*** 0.000673 -0.0704*** -0.0264* -0.00164 -0.000925 0.0129**
(0.0105) (0.0109) (0.0106) (0.0113) (0.0104) (0.0108) (0.0141) (0.00425)
Interpersonal 
Trust
0.114*** 0.158*** 0.131*** 0.157*** 0.0848** 0.153*** 0.145*** 0.131***
(0.0245) (0.0268) (0.0262) (0.0270) (0.0287) (0.0281) (0.0392) (0.0107)
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Org.  
Participation 
0.125* 0.163* 0.0937 0.0659 0.0363 -0.0871 0.404** 0.0961***
(0.0539) (0.0736) (0.104) (0.0666) (0.0907) (0.0705) (0.125) (0.0288)
Rural 0.287*** 0.146 0.254*** -0.145 0.201** 0.241*** 0.133 0.137***
(0.0852) (0.0891) (0.0753) (0.0800) (0.0756) (0.0726) (0.0833) (0.0274)
Wealth  
(Asset In-
dex)
-0.000903 -0.00699 -0.0419* 0.0137 -0.0367* -0.0228 -0.0892*** -0.0201**
(0.0170) (0.0187) (0.0185) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0187) (0.0268) (0.00718)
Age -0.00595*** -0.00609*** -0.00318* -0.00170 -0.00197 -0.00631*** -0.0143*** -0.00540***
(0.00155) (0.00169) (0.00154) (0.00157) (0.00156) (0.00152) (0.00229) (0.000639)
Gender (Man) -0.133** -0.0779 0.0291 -0.0481 0.0787 -0.0498 -0.108 -0.0433*
(0.0430) (0.0475) (0.0437) (0.0423) (0.0435) (0.0432) (0.0685) (0.0180)
Education -0.00338 -0.00154 -0.00467 -0.00786 -0.0182** -0.0242*** -0.0631*** -0.0174***
(0.00576) (0.00609) (0.00606) (0.00605) (0.00564) (0.00581) (0.00913) (0.00238)
Year Dummy 
2006
0.439***
(0.0352)
Year Dummy 
2008
0.366***
(0.0443)
Year Dummy 
2010
0.389***
(0.0344)
Year Dummy 
2012
0.215***
(0.0424)
Year Dummy 
2014
0.303***
(0.0425)
Year Dummy 
2017
0.300***
(0.0605)
Indige-
nous*2006
-0.128
(0.0885)
Indige-
nous*2008
0.250**
(0.0913)
Indige-
nous*2010
0.347***
(0.0928)
Indige-
nous*2012
0.172
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(0.0940)
Indigenous* 
2014
0.0719
(0.0904)
Indigenous* 
2017
0.192
(0.111)
Constant 3.210*** 3.614*** 3.851*** 4.261*** 4.021*** 4.065*** 5.070*** 3.668***
(0.141) (0.150) (0.139) (0.147) (0.155) (0.144) (0.196) (0.0643)
Municipal 
Level (t00)
0.134 0.114 0.120 0.147 0.207 0.130 0.020 0.069
(0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.034) (0.043) (0.030) (0.016) (0.009)
# of Munici-
palities
82 83 119 118 86 76 64 2259
# of Obser-
vations
2357 1953 2055 2140 2072 2178 1297 14052
-2 x Log 
Likelihood 
-3448.79 -2848.31 -2880.89 -2993.09 -2946.61 -3104.83 -2087.64 -20698.55
Standard errors in parentheses.
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001
Appendix Table 4.  
Winners, Losers, and System Support 2010 and 2017
MAS  
Supporters 
2010
MAS  
Supporters 
2017
Winners and 
Losers by  
Ethnicity 
2010
Winners and 
Losers by  
Ethnicity 
2017
Indigenous 0.224** 0.0762 0.403* 0.0271
(0.0785) (0.125) (0.193) (0.293)
Winner (MAS Supporter) 0.607*** 0.856*** 0.624*** 0.851***
(0.0610) (0.0934) (0.0631) (0.0972)
Indigenous*Winner  
(MAS Supporter) -0.210 0.0597
(0.206) (0.321)
Left/Right -0.0427** 0.0201 -0.0420** 0.0200
(0.0137) (0.0170) (0.0137) (0.0170)
Interpersonal Trust 0.182*** 0.116* 0.181*** 0.117*
(0.0316) (0.0488) (0.0316) (0.0488)
Organizational Partici-
pation 0.0336 0.263 0.0359 0.262
(0.0756) (0.149) (0.0756) (0.149)
Rural -0.307*** 0.185 -0.308*** 0.185
(0.0916) (0.0964) (0.0919) (0.0965)
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Wealth (Asset Index) 0.0302 -0.0229 0.0300 -0.0230
(0.0210) (0.0338) (0.0210) (0.0339)
Age -0.00148 -0.0103*** -0.00149 -0.0103***
(0.00191) (0.00303) (0.00190) (0.00303)
Gender (Man) -0.0808 -0.0593 -0.0809 -0.0599
(0.0502) (0.0856) (0.0502) (0.0856)
Education -0.00627 -0.0357** -0.00615 -0.0356**
(0.00729) (0.0111) (0.00729) (0.0111)
Constant 3.740*** 3.786*** 3.729*** 3.789***
(0.186) (0.263) (0.186) (0.264)
Municipal level (t00) 0.150 0.011 0.1532 0.0121
(0.037) (0.019) (0.038) (0.0192)
Number of Observations 1435 785 1435 785
Number of Municipalities 117 64 117 64
-2 x log likelihood -1959.58 -1229.58 -1959.07 -1229.57
Note: Multilevel logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001
Appendix Table 5.  
System Support and Bribe Victimization 2010
Bribe  
Victim
Bribe Victim &  
Ethnicity
Bribe Victim,  
Winners & 
Losers
Indigenous 0.234** 0.193* 0.233**
(0.0784) (0.0870) (0.0784)
Bribe Victimization -0.223*** -0.248*** -0.197*
(0.0600) (0.0643) (0.0867)
Winner (MAS  
Supporter) 0.593
*** 0.593*** 0.607***
(0.0608) (0.0607) (0.0696)
Indigenous*Bribe  
Victim 0.182
(0.169)
Winners*Bribe Victim -0.0469
(0.114)
Left/Right -0.0401** -0.0404** -0.0399**
(0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0136)
Interpersonal Trust 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.177***
(0.0315) (0.0315) (0.0315)
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Organizational 
Participation 0.0464 0.0446 0.0468
(0.0753) (0.0753) (0.0753)
Rural -0.324*** -0.325*** -0.325***
(0.0923) (0.0924) (0.0923)
Wealth (Asset Index) 0.0344 0.0348 0.0344
(0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0210)
Age -0.00122 -0.00119 -0.00125
(0.00190) (0.00190) (0.00190)
Gender (man) -0.0585 -0.0550 -0.0579
(0.0502) (0.0503) (0.0502)
Education -0.00427 -0.00424 -0.00421
(0.00728) (0.00727) (0.00728)
Constant 3.751*** 3.755*** 3.742***
(0.185) (0.185) (0.186)
Municipal level (t00) 0.1557 0.1562 0.1555
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Number of  
Municipalities 117 117 117
-2 x log likelihood -1948.76 -1948.18 -1948.68
Number of  
Observations 1433 1433 1433
Note: Multilevel logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses.  
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001
Appendix Table 6. 
 System Support and Bribe Victimization 2017
Bribe Victim Bribe Victim & Ethnicity
Bribe Victim,  
Winners & 
Losers
Indigenous 0.0958 0.210 0.0940
(0.124) (0.159) (0.124)
Bribe Victimization -0.318*** -0.277** -0.391**
(0.0879) (0.0947) (0.145)
Winner (MAS  
Supporter) 0.840
*** 0.841*** 0.797***
(0.0927) (0.0926) (0.114)
Indigenous*Bribe 
Victim -0.283
(0.242)
Winners*Bribe Victim 0.113
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(0.180)
Left/Right 0.0200 0.0191 0.0207
(0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169)
Interpersonal Trust 0.109* 0.109* 0.108*
(0.0484) (0.0483) (0.0484)
Organizational  
Participation 0.298
* 0.292* 0.298*
(0.148) (0.148) (0.148)
Rural 0.174 0.178 0.178
(0.0946) (0.0941) (0.0946)
Wealth (Asset Index) -0.0202 -0.0204 -0.0201
(0.0335) (0.0334) (0.0335)
Age -0.0114*** -0.0113*** -0.0113***
(0.00302) (0.00302) (0.00302)
Gender (man) -0.00458 -0.00242 -0.00682
(0.0862) (0.0862) (0.0863)
Education -0.0345** -0.0346** -0.0343**
(0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110)
Constant 3.919*** 3.902*** 3.942***
(0.263) (0.263) (0.266)
Municipal Level (t00) 0.008 0.007 0.008
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Number of  
Observations 785 785 785
Number of  
Municipalities 64 64 64
-2 x log likelihood -1223.103 -1222.423 -1222.906
Note: Multilevel logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses.  
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001
